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EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF CALIBRATED
SENTENCING: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR KOLBER
Miriam H. Baer*
Response to: AdamJ. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment,
109 Colum. L. Rev. 182 (2009).
Adam Kolber's thoughtful essay contends that variations in the
subjective experience of punishment warrant a more nuanced manner
by which courts mete out sentences for violations of criminal law.'
Failure to take subjective experience into consideration, Kolber argues,
violates not only notions of retributive justice, but also consequentialist
arguments grounded in theories about how we can best deter crime.'
This Response considers Kolber's consequentialist arguments in
light of the neoclassical economic understanding of deterrence.
According to the standard economic understanding of criminal law,
individuals are deterred from committing crimes when they are made to
feel "costs" equivalent to the harm they cause society, modified by the
probability that they will be punished.' When the "costs" of engaging in
criminal conduct outweigh the net benefits of such conduct, the
criminal refrains from committing that crime. Apart from reputation
costs and moral qualms, the government-mandated punishment that the
criminal defendant receives upon conviction is a significant portion of
the costs that she must weigh against the perceived benefits of
completing a given crime.
According to Kolber, society loses out when sentencing regimes fail
to consider varying subjective experiences of imprisonment because they
fail to take into account the defendant's true costs of punishment. As a
result, if we set punishment at some specified amount for everyone (say,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author gratefully thanks
Adam Kolber foi his comments on this Response.
1. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum. L. Rev.
182 (2009).
2. Id. at 183-84.
3. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985).
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a ten-year imprisonment for all car thefts), we may excessively deter the
person who is terrified of prison ("Sensitive," in Kolber's essay), and
underdeter the person who is either unafraid or even looking forward to
spending time in prison ("Insensitive"). Since underdeterrence and
overdeterrence are both costly to society, Kolber argues, we should
desire a system that either avoids or corrects these results. Thus,
calibration of sentencing is desirable because it decreases the overall
costs of deterring crime.4
As Kolber himself recognizes,' most sentencing systems are not
quite as crude as he fears. For example, in numerous states and under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, recidivists receive substantially
higher sentences than first-time offenders for the same crimes. These
increased penalties (which ordinary deterrence theory sometimes
struggles to explain') make sense if one assumes that recidivists are less
sensitive to prison than "ordinary" first-time criminals and therefore
require harsher punishments. Moreover, in numerous systems, courts
may take into account particularly heinous aspects of a crime in order to
increase a defendant's sentence above some prescribed baseline.
Although retributive accounts may well explain this increase, deterrence
theory also provides an explanation: Through particular conduct, the
defendant has indicated that he will be less deterred by some baseline
sentence than the "ordinary" violator of the same statute. By the same
token, in very limited circumstances, courts have reduced sentences to
reflect a defendant's particularized vulnerability to prison conditions.
Despite these safety valves, Kolber is correct: As a general rule, we
do not finely evaluate a given defendant's subjective experience of
4. Kolber, supra note 1, at 217-18.
5. See id. at 188-89 (noting "courts sometimes accommodate objective differences in
prisoners' likely conditions of confinement" and providing United States v. Blarek, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), as an example).
6. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1 (2008) (calculating
defendant's "Criminal History" level on basis of prior convictions); id. ch. 5, pt. A (setting
up sentencing table that dramatically increases defendant's sentence depending on
Criminal History category); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good
Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (2008) (observing that "all American
jurisdictions ... in some form or another" take defendant's "bad acts," including his prior
convictions, into account at sentencing).
7. See Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent
Misconduct, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 609, 621 (2007) ("Since for the purpose of setting optimal
sanctions all instances of the same crime are identical, the neoclassical approach does not
draw a distinction between the one-time and serial offender.").
8. If these facts place the case beyond a prescribed statutory maximum, they must be
proved to ajury. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."). Otherwise, courts may rely on these facts to increase the defendant's sentence
but are not necessarily bound to do so. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250
(2005) (finding provision making sentencing guidelines mandatory "along with those
inextricably connected to it" to be constitutionally invalid as violating Sixth Amendment).
9. See supra note 5.
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punishment. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to reject a more
calibrated sentencing regime. To better understand why, the remainder
of this Response considers two counterargunents: First, subjective
reactions to punishment (most often imprisonment) may benefit law
enforcers by causing overdeterred individuals to "self-regulate" while the
police focus scarce resources on more recalcitrant individuals; and
second, excess sensitivity to punishment deters group-oriented crimes by
spurring individuals to take extra steps to report or prevent others from
engaging in criminal conduct.
Although these arguments provide different glosses on the problem
that Kolber has identified, they are tied together by a common theme:
Any call for calibrating punishment must also take into account the way
in which we distribute law enforcement resources for monitoring and
detection. 0 Sentencing is just one variable of deterrence. However
desirable it may be to take greater account of subjective experience from
a retributivist perspective (the primary thrust of Kolber's essay), it is far
less clear that Kolber's proposed regime delivers the consequentialist
benefits that he promises.
I. SELF-REGULATION AND THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
The first reason we might prefer the current sentencing system to
Kolber's is that we believe it is more effective to focus calibration efforts
on the criminal's probability of detection and not on the sanction that
he ultimately receives. For a number of reasons discussed below,
calibrated policing may be more efficient (and therefore more
beneficial) than calibrated sentencing.
Neoclassical criminal law and economics dictates that policymakers
should set criminal sanctions to approximate the value of the harm
caused by the defendant, modified by the probability of his
punishment." When sanctions and harm are not strictly monetary in
nature, there is a translation problem: The sanction that the
government sets might not accurately reflect the harm the defendant
causes, regardless of the probability of detection and punishment.
Accordingly, some people are overdeterred because they are overly
sensitive to prison, while others are underdeterred because they are
unafraid of prison. While some might argue that these mistakes
counteract and average out over time, Kolber sees overdeterrence and
underdeterrence as imposing different, but added, costs."
Overdeterrence fuels risk aversion and imposes excessive prison
costs, causing prisoners to miss opportunities for contributing more
productively to society. Underdeterrence, by contrast, permits criminals
10. Although he does not specifically refer to the term, Kolber dismisses calibrated
policing on the grounds that police cannot predict subjective reactions to punishment.
See Kolber, supra note 1, at 218 n.101.
11. See supra text accompanying note 3.
12. Kolber, supra note 1, at 217-18.
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to commit more crimes (assuming they know in advance that jail is no
big impediment) thereby causing more harm.
So overdeterrence and underdeterrence are costly. The issue,
however, is not whether we should find ways to reduce these costs, but
whether Kolber's scheme offers the best method for doing so. As I
explain in this Response, calibrated sentencing is less optimal than its
logical alternative: calibrating the probability of punishment, which I call
"calibrated policing.""'
Two factors explain the preference for calibrated policing over
calibrated sentencing. First, public law enforcement agencies have
limited resources. They can investigate, indict, and litigate only so many
cases. Second, public law enforcement is largely a probabilistic
enterprise. Through trial and error, and with the benefit of some
sophisticated analysis if they are lucky, policymakers and high-level
police personnel distribute resources based on estimations either that a
particular type of crime will occur, or that a particular geographic area
can be made less crimogenic through additional policing or sanctions.
These decisions may be further clouded by predictions as to how a
particular type of policing will affect a given community.
Given the fact that law enforcers have to make decisions on the basis
of imperfect information, it is not surprising that they often find
shortfalls in deterrence. Some people will be overdeterred by a given
combination of sanctions and policing, whereas others will be
underdeterred. Policymakers then need to adjust the formula. They can
do so by increasing overall sanctions or overall enforcement, or by
calibrating sanctions or calibrating policing.
The problem with increasing overall sanctions-however attractive
this tactic may seen-is that it increases the overall pool of overdeterred
individuals without necessarily improving the underdeterred side of the
equation. This is so because the underdeterred may be overly myopic,
overly optimistic about their ability to avoid detection, or thrill seekers
who like to violate laws. Moreover, increased sanctions will usually
translate into more (and more expensive) prison expenditures. Finally,
if sanctions for lesser crimes are pushed too high, we lose the benefit of
"marginal" deterrence. If stealing $100 results in the same punishment
as stealing $1,000, criminals have no reason to stop at $100.
Increasing overall enforcement is also problematic insofar as it
requires society to devote more resources to policing. More important,
it is unnecessary because the police can instead calibrate their efforts. If,
for a given pool of putative defendants, Group A is initially overdeterred
(due to its excessive fear of a given sanction) and Group B is initially
underdeterred (because its members are substantially less sensitive to
that sanction), law enforcement agents can transfer enforcement focus
13. The probability of punishment is the multiple of the likelihood that one will be
detected, prosecuted, and punished. Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of
Corporate Fraid, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1306-07 (2008).
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from Group A to Group B without requesting additional resources or
increasing the overall crime rate. Even though the probability of
detection decreases for Group A, its members remain compliant with the
law because they were already overdeterred. Accordingly, Group A "self-
regulates."' 4
So the question is not whether we should increase overall sanctions
or overall enforcement, but rather, whether it is better to calibrate
punishment or calibrate policing. Apart from the administrative
concerns that Kolber addresses in his essay,' a number of conditions
might favor calibrated policing over calibrated sanctions. They include
the fact that "insensitivity" may be a local or temporary phenomenon
and therefore better solved more flexibly through increased law
enforcement focus. The transaction costs involved with calibrated
sentencing (likely to require some sort of legislative action, at least at the
outset) will likely exceed the costs of calibrated policing, which is
primarily the domain of the police.
In addition, calibrated sentencing may veer too far toward helping
"sensitive" individuals reduce their sentences, without appropriately
increasing the sentences of "insensitive" individuals. This is so because
sensitive individuals have far more incentive to publicly raise their
subjective fears to courts and legislators than their underdeterred
counterparts.
Even if we could detect one's responsiveness to punishment with a
low error rate, we still should prefer calibrated policing to calibrated
sentencing when underdeterred individuals maintain an overly
optimistic low probability of apprehension and punishment." If a
defendant believes there is only a one percent chance he will be
punished, the expected value of the "extra" sentence for the insensitive
individual is also reduced to one percent of that amount. Even worse,
14. See Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal
Law Enforcement, 17J.L. Econ. & Org. 239, 239-40 (2001). Innes describes the benefits
of "self-reporting" which is a somewhat different concept from self-regulation. Self-
regulators refrain from criminal conduct, whereas self-reporters admit what they have
done. Nevertheless, self-regulators and self-reporters produce similar effects in that they
require less monitoring.
15. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability,
37 J.L. & Econ. 1, 3 (1994) (opining that when it is expensive to invest in improving
accuracy of sanctions, "it may be more efficient to raise the level of enforcement effort").
16. Kolber, supra note 1, at 219-28 (discussing administrative challenges, including
predicting and monitoring subjective experiences of punishment).
17. For the notion that probability should be increased to reduce criminals' mistakes
in calculating the value of expected sanctions, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow,
Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of
Apprehension, 21 J. Legal Stud. 365, 366-67 (1992) (demonstrating that errors will be
greater when probabilities of punishment are low because even small changes in
probability will be multiplied against very large sanctions). For the argument that
enforcement agents should focus on increasing probability of punishment when
defendants discount or experience decreased disutility in regard to marginal increases in
sanctions, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28J. Legal Stud. 1, 11 (1999).
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punishment is a remote event in the distant future. Discounts therefore
figure into the criminal's calculation of the "disutility" of punishment.'
Just as a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow, the disutility
of prison today is worth far more than the disutility of prison four years
from now. According to some accounts, criminals discount future events
more than law-abiding individuals."' If the psychological factors that
cause someone to be insensitive to the reputational and physical stresses
of prison also cause them to severely underestimate their likelihood of
punishment, heightened policing provides far more benefit than harsher
or lengthier terms of confinement.
Some may question a state's ability to identify overdeterred and
underdeterred persons at the policing stage.2 " Signaling and data
collection can greatly assist the police in figuring out who needs more
policing and who needs less. That is, those who wish to receive less
police oversight may take certain steps to signal their adherence to law.
By the same token, some individuals will signal their unwillingness to
comply with the law, primarily by breaking it repeatedly. Calibrated
policing is thus a story about how the state learns from its prior
enforcement mistakes. The aggregation and analysis of statistical data
permits police departments to assess risks and shift resources over time.
The use of data to calibrate policing is in fact the basis of "COMPSTAT,"
the widely praised program that the New York Police Department and
other departments across the country adopted in the 1990s and
thereafter.22 That is not to say the system is perfect; the data can be
flawed and the response can be either premature or overdue." But the
system carries with it the ability to adjust relatively quickly to new
information and unforeseen circumstances.
18. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 3-4.
19. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of
Discounting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 115, 124 (2007) (collecting
sources indicating that criminals are particularly myopic).
20. Kolber dismisses the ability of a state to do this. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 218
n.101.
21. Cf. Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the
Shadow of the Regulator, 24 J.L. Econ. & Org. 45, 62 (2008) (theorizing in regulatory
context that firms might self-report violations as means of signaling pro-compliance stance
to regulators).
22. COMPSTAT is a management tool that police commissioners use to gather
statistical information on a regular basis and hold precinct commanders accountable for
policing deficiencies. "Combining cutting-edge crime analysis and geographic
information systems with state-of-the-art management principles, COMPSTAT burst onto
the scene when it was first implemented in 1994 by then-Commissioner William Bratton of
the New York City Police Department (NYPD)." James J. Willis, Stephen Di Mastrofski &
David Weisburd, Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of
Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 Law & Soc'y Rev. 147, 148
(2007).
23. Moreover, we must monitor the police to make sure that "overdeterred" and
"underdeterred" are not proxies for racial or socioeconomic characteristics. These issues
also arise, however, in calibrated sentencing schemes to the extent one views sensitivity as
a social construct and not some scientifically proven fact.
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To sum up, societies must make decisions on how to distribute
policing resources and sanctions. 'When they do so, they will inevitably
make mistakes because their decisions are based on probabilistic
predictions of how people will react to policing and sanctions as a whole.
To the extent calibrated policing allows police to focus more on the
underdeterred, yet also benefits from the self-regulation of the
overdeterred, society might well embrace it as the most sensible and cost-
effective option for adjusting to changing conditions in law
enforcement.
II. REGULATION OF OTHERS
Another reason we may prefer objective sentencing to Kolber's
proposal is that sensitive individuals might assist the police not only by
regulating themselves, but also by regulating others. Following most
economic models of deterrence, Kolber's model presumes that
defendants commit crimes individually." In real life, however, much
criminal conduct is executed by groups. For crimes as diverse as
corporate accounting fraud to complex drug dealing and gang violence,
groups of individuals plan, execute, and cover up their conduct. Group
crime poses two particular problems. First, because it leverages the
abilities of multiple perpetrators, it often causes greater harm than a
singular offender.2 ' Second, because it spreads responsibility out among
different perpetrators and often shields the most dangerous of those
perpetrators from public view, it is difficult to detect and punish."
Even legitimate group settings (a publicly owned company, for
example) can create conditions for criminal conduct to thrive over
surprisingly long periods of time. Antisnitching and loyalty norms may
cause employees who suspect wrongdoing to keep quiet rather than
report wrongdoing to superiors within the company or outside
investigators.S Cognitive biases may cause witnesses to interpret
24. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with
the Guilty: The Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36J. Legal Stud. 81,
81 (2007) (noting that "[i]n standard economic models of law enforcement, the chief
objective is first to identify, and then punish, the offender," but "there are many
enforcement contexts in which the identity of the offender is uncertain but he or she is
known to be a member of a well-defined group").
25. See, e.g., Neal Kunar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1307, 1315-28
(2003) (explaining importance of group interactions to success of criminal conspiracies).
26. See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1535
(2008) (discussing benefits of RICO statute in overcoming "incentives of an organization's
leaders to delegate acts to underlings and thicken the insulation within criminal groups").
27. Antisnitching campaigns have become prevalent in the context of urban policing.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation
and Response, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1193, 1204-06 (2008) (discussing rise and effectiveness
of "stopsnitching" campaigns).
28. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91, 121-
22 (2007) (describing "social ostracism" that can impede employees from reporting
corporate and securities fraud).
17
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR
questionable behavior as legitimate business conduct rather than a
violation of law.29 Finally, collective action dynamics may result in an
atmosphere in which everyone assumes that someone else should (or
will) take care of the problem, and yet no one does.!'
In sum, groups can promote, hide, or acquiesce in bad behavior.
Because they can do such harm, much of substantive and procedural
criminal law is aimed at enabling law enforcement agents to penetrate
group conduct, either by criminalizing the group's existence, infiltrating
it with undercover officers, or offering incentives to group members to
cooperate with law enforcement agents and report on the rest of the
group.'
Just as excess sensitivities to punishment may benefit society by
creating "self-restraint" when the probability of detection is low, they may
be of even greater value in restraining criminal conduct in group
settings. The putative criminal who is overdeterred ex ante by a given
sentence may, in addition to regulating herself, also regulate others to
reduce the risk that she will be wrongfully associated with (or
incidentally harmed by) members of a criminal group.
This phenomenon manifests itself in several ways. An overdeterred
individual may be so risk averse that she declines to deal with people who
she perceives as "shady." She may be so wary of criminal conduct that
she feels the need to report any suspect activity to authorities in order to
demonstrate her bona fides. She may even attempt to convince others
not to engage in a given criminal act because she fears the consequences
of such conduct for herself and her colleagues. If our ordinary
inclination is to mind our own business and leave others to their own
devices, then oversensitivity to punishment may be the force that causes
us to abandon the mind-your-own-business norm and our natural
unwillingness to confront others with evidence of wrongdoing. In sum,
"excessive" fear of punishment may transform otherwise self-interested
individuals into monitors and whistleblowers, thereby enhancing and
extending the police powers of the state.
Whether overdeterred individuals make themselves obvious to
29. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 Colim. Bus. L. Rev. 71, 85-88 (explaining that supervisors in
corporate settings will interpret ambiguous conduct as consistent with the law to avoid,
among other things, unpleasant confrontations or calling into question previous hiring or
promotion decisions).
30. Collective action problems occur When the costs of a particular action outweigh
its benefits to an individual, even though the action benefits the group as a whole. See
generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (1971) (explaining foundations of collective action problems and arguing that
large or latent groups are unlikely to act in their common interest); Dan M. Kahan, The
Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003)
(explaining collective action problems, how they impact criminal law, and how they may
be overcome by feelings of trust and reciprocity).
31. See Buell, supra note 26, at 1527-36 (examining doctrinal development of
racketeering law).
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others, or whether they serve as a hypothetical risk, they impose a cost on
criminal groups insofar as they force those groups to invest time and
effort in avoiding detection. Instead of spending time harming others,
the criminal group must devote limited resources to avoiding getting
caught.
This is not to say that the above phenomena are all normatively
desirable or dependent solely on variations in deterrence. Social norms
would likely promote a desire to avoid unethical behavior, regardless of
whether individuals were particularly fearful of imprisonment." More
important, a system that overly relies on individuals to police each other,
or encourages them to do so excessively, may create problems far greater
than the original harm the government seeks to avoid." This is
particularly the case when the distrust that permeates criminal matters
spills over into ordinary and desirable group conduct, such as
community action or legitimate business activity. Nevertheless, the
overall benefits of these mechanisms may well outweigh the costs of
eliminating them outright. Proposals such as Kolber's therefore must be
evaluated with group dynamics (and group-based crimes) in mind. If
calibrated sentences on the back-end reduce private "policing" on the
front-end, we may find ourselves with more group-oriented (and perhaps
more dangerous) crimes.
CONCLUSION
For matters of deterrence, sentencing and policing are
interdependent. Viewed piecemeal, the argument for calibrating
sentences makes sense. A holistic analysis of law enforcement, however,
yields different conclusions. Without proper attention to policing,
calibrated sentencing can produce less deterrence and more crime, an
outcome society ordinarily would choose to avoid. 4
One of the reasons deterrence is such a difficult notion is that we
must translate the often unquantifiable harm that someone has caused
into a punishment that, in many respects, is also unquantifiable. At the
same time, we must make numerous probabilistic calculations about how
people will respond to the manner in which we define, police, prosecute,
and punish a wide swath of criminal conduct. Kolber is indeed correct
that one person's subjective experience of a given prison sentence can
vary wildly from another person's experience. But it is not at all clear
32. On the other hand, other norns might "obligat[e] silence." Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 348,
350-51 (1997) (defining norms as nonlegal obligations).
33. See Miriam H. Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can
We Learn from Hewlett-Packard's Pretexting Scandal?, 77 I. Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2009) (mantuscript at 55-57, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://ssrn.con/abstiact=1133117 (describing benefits and drawbacks of such policing in
corporate context).
34. Of coturSe, society may have other considerations, but this Response deals only
with the consequentialist implications of Professor Kolber's argument.
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that uncalibrated punishment leads to "massively inaccurate"3 deterrence,
particularly if one takes into account the monitoring and detection that
precedes the imposition of punishment. Whatever the plausibility of
implementing calibrated sentencing, it is impossible to assess its value
without also taking into account the manner in which we police criminal
conduct.
Preferred Citation: Miriam H. Baer, Evaluating the Consequences of Calibrated
Sentencing. A Response to Professor Kolber, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 11
(2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/
11_Baer.pdf.
35. Kolber, sipra note 1, at 186.
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